The Foolishness of Dion George.

Being the first DA appointed Fisheries Minister, we held out much hope that Dion George would significantly move away from the catestrophic policies and incomptent management that has defined fisheries management in this country for some 15 years now. 

ANC fisheries policy since Joemat-Petterssen has been defined by corruption, incompetence, typical redistribution of a contracting quota pie to more and more "fishers" with the consequnce that nearshore fisheries have essentially all collapsed and of the 22 healthy and functioning commercial fisheries we had back in 2005, we are down to 13 at best today. And yet we have 1000's more quota holders! 

The DA of course supposedly prides itself on its strategies of "growth", competence and collaboration with industry / fishers to grow the SA economy. Minister's George's leadeership since 3 July 2024 has been a copy-and-paste of the incompetence and dithering that has defined ANC mismanagement of our fisheries since Marthinus Van Schalkwyk. 

What makes George's leadership at fisheries so much more stark in his failure, is the plain-sight comparison to the radical changes his colleagues are making at Home Affairs and Public Works, for example. 

George could have - 

• fixed the corruption and incompetence endemic in fisheries compliance and administration. He was given the names and evidence. 
• refused to continue to implement ANC fisheries policies that simply allocate unviable and unsustainable quotas to "co-operative" communities led by sheisters and corrupt ANC-appointed chiefs.
• undertaken a comprehensive review of current fisheries policies and instructed the urgent commencement of new fisheries development and thus fisheries sector growth. Again, he was given the information to do this. 

In June 2024, we actually provided some crib notes for quick wins he could have achieved - See here.

South Africa has never had an "expert" appointed as Minister responsible for fisheries. Hardly unexpected.  My old friend, Svein Munkejord, was appointed as fisheries minister for Norway many decades ago having been a professional fisheries man before that and subsequently continued to advise South Africa and the United Nations on fisheries until the mid-2000's. And Iceland is reknowned for regularly appointing industry leaders to serve as fisheries minister. 

When Valli Moosa was appointed fisheries and environment minister back in June 1999, he inherited a department fraught with corruption and incompetent leadership - as did almost all subsequent ANC Ministers such as Joemat-Petterssen, Zokwana and then Creecy and now George! [The inheritance of corruption and incompetence is of course a hallmark of ANC ministerial leadership].

The key difference was that Moosa immediately appointed a group of experts to advise him independently of the inherited bureacracy despite the fact that Moosa's predecessor was an ANC colleague. Similarly, Zokwana was able to fix the failed FRAP 2013 he inherited from Joemat-Petterssen only because he appointed a group of independent experts. 

Sadly for George, he has elected to be led by the nose down the garden path of ongoing fisheries failure and mismanagement by the same people that ran fisheries into the ground under Creecy. The DA is doing itself significant harm in Western Cape fishing communities by perpetuating ANC policy, corruption and mismanagement as it directly hurts local fishers. 

What is Dion George Doing with Abalone? Deliberately Destroying any DA GOODWILL Through Gross Incompetence?

On 28 January 2025, Dion George's fisheries department issued a decision to refuse to grant abalone fishing exemptions to 179 historic divers because they had apparently committed multiple serious violations of the MLRA. 

Additionally, 83 exemption holders were found to have committed "minor" violations of the MLRA and were instructed to pay "admission of guilt fines" or not have their fishing permits issued. And they were told (dishinonestly) by fisheries staff that the payment of admission of guilt fines would not reflect on their criminal records and these fines "have nothing to do with prosecutors and magistrates"! These are obvious lies that unlawfully coerced many exemption holders to admit to crimes they never committed in order to desperately secure access to their fishing permits so as to earn a living. 

The decision of 28 January 2025 was apparently the consequence of a 6-month long investigation into compliance conduct by abalone exemption holders. The investigations - we are told - were completed in December 2024 where these hundreds of violations were "found" to have been committed by these 262 exemption holders. [It is worth noting that there are no more than 290 exemption holders in the entire fishery, which means that according to the department, 90% of divers committed violations of the MLRA].

This in itself ought to have caused any Minister and his senior fisheries staff to pause and double-check the "findings" of their supposed investigations! A 90% violation rate for any fishery is simply not even comprehensible! But not for the geniuses running the fisheries department. They proceeded to refuse to issue fishing permits to 179 exemption holders and then sought to blackmail the additional 83 exemption holders into paying fines. 

Problem 1: A significant number of those accused of "minor" violations - the 83 - refused to pay admission of guilt fines and instead challenged the fines which have since been withdrawn because the department made repeated and basic errors in their "investigations". For example, exemption holders were accused of landing fish against permits that dont even exist and because their vessels failed to report their positions despite the fact that it is widely known that the Department's Vessel Monitoring System is outdated and barely functional and the reporting problem lies with the department. 

Problem 2: Lying to exemption holders about the consequences of paying an admission of guilt fine in order to coerce them into paying fines is egregious and shameful. Paying an admission of guilt fine means that the contravention is recorded as a criminal offence and can affect ones ability to apply for VISA's, jobs, future fishing permits etc. 

Problem 3: The department has failed to inform any one of the 179 exemption holders accused of the supposed multiple and serious violations of the MLRA and what these charges are but has already found them each guilty by refusing them their fishing permits. It's been 4 months since the department says their obviously flawed investigations were completed and yet they have failed to even notifty a single exemption holder of these "serious" charges. The violations of due process, the provisions of the MLRA and the exemption holders' Constitutional rights to fair, just and lawful adminsitrative action is of great concern. 

The conduct to which these exemption holders have been subjected to by the Fisheries Department is entirely expected from a corrupt and inept ANC administration. Such conduct was the hallmark of the FRAP 2022 for example, which resulted in more than 120 successful review applications against the Fisheries Minister. 

But what on earth is Dion Geroge and the DA doing by simply repeating the failures of the ANC administration? The DA is effectively causing signifcant harm to fishing communities in the Western Cape with this type of heavy-handed, unlawful ANC-style mafia conduct. 

A DA FISHERIES MINISTER ISSUING 11 TON HAKE LONG LINE FISHING RIGHTS!

Minister Dion George of the Democratic Alliance has issued 11 ton hake long line fishing rights. Yes, you read that correctly. 11 tons. Of hake long line granted to new entrant, black-owned fishing companies! 

If you are not familiar with fishing, an 11 ton hake long line fishing quota is worth about R80,000 annually, where vessels cost upward of R10 million (used and 50 years old); and processing and export costs would consume 50% of that income.

11 tons would be caught in approximately 10 hours of fishing. 

Essentially, allocating 11 ton rights to right holders is effectively unlawful as those right holders can only ever be paper quota holders in violation of the MLRA and policies promulgated in terms of it. 

It is inconceivable how Minister Dion George of the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE could allocate right holders such quotas particuarly since the Hake Long Line Fishing Policy states that the allocation of quota must "facilitate their meaningful participation in the fishery throughout the value chain.

COMMENT ON THE DRAFT TRANSFER & FISH PROCESSING POLICIES

We submitted the following comments on the draft fish processing establishment and transfer of commercial fishing rights policies. 

The draft Fish Processing Establishment Policy

In short, our comment is that the draft FPE policy is an anachronistic, archaic reproduction of past ANC-led fishing policy that has stifled and stunted economic growth and activity in the South African commercial fishing industry. The draft FPE policy ought to be binned in its current format.

Our high-level comments follow. 

1. Firstly, the draft policy records that there are currently approximately 346 (138 land-based, 198 vessel-based and a combination 10 of land based and vessel-based) right/exemption holders across the country. In short, the department simply does not know who or what is processing fish. 

2  Secondly, the MLRA definition of “fish processing” is so wide that an FPE right and permit is legally required by every fish monger / fish shop, every retailer of seafood (Woolworths, Checkers, Pick-n-Pay, etc etc), every “slap chips and fish” seller, every fishing vessel, every restaurant, every cafe - essentially every single entity or natural person that touches seafood for a commercial reason must apply for a right and then a permit. 

3. If this was actually enforced and required by the Department, the administrative burden would simply collapse the department within a week. 

4. The draft FPE policy seeks to only burden such persons unnecessarily. 

5. What is required, is an urgent re-write of the MLRA, including this definition of what constitutes an FPE. 

6. Until such time, a “draft FPE policy” should instead focus on EXEMPTING under section 81 of the MLRA every category of processor (including every single fishing vessel which currently requires to apply separately each year for an “FPE Permit” despite being a right holder) from the requirements of section 18 and 13. 

7. Instead, every processor of seafood should instead be invited to register under specified categories (Cafe, fish monger, retailer (large, medium, small) etc) so that the Department is aware of the number and locations of these processors.

8. The draft FPE policy can instead then focus on the formal regulation and permitting of specified processors - ie those that process seafood that is considered endangered, overfished or threatened such as abalone, lobster, red-listed line fish species, sharks, tooth fish, roughy, guitar fish, skates and rays etc. 

9. The criteria to register as such a processor of seafood ought to be designed to ensure that as far as possible, the illicit and illegal and unregulated trade in these species is curtailed if not eliminated. 

10. The current draft FPE policy serves little point other than to further stifle growth and bureaucratize seafood processing without in any way achieving the important objectives of monitoring, management and protection of seafood processing (and trade). 

The draft Transfer of Commercial Fishing Rights Policy

The draft transfer policy - like the draft FPE Policy - is an anachronistic, archaic reproduction of past ANC-led fishing policy that has stifled and stunted economic growth and activity in the South African commercial fishing industry. The draft transfer policy ought to be binned in its current format.

Our high-level comments follow. 

1. OVERREACH 

1.1 The draft transfer policy purports to apply to and regulate the changes of membership and shares. This is impermissible given the obiter findings of the Western Cape High Court in the case of Glenda Clarke & Others vs Ismail Antooley & Others [including the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries] [Case No. 15312/2015], where the court held that - 

"23. It bears noting that s 21(2) of the MLRA does not specifically require that an application under that section is necessary when an interest in a close corporation is sold. The section merely provides that an application for the transfer of a commercial fishing right must be submitted to the Minister and that such an application must be approved in writing. 

25. … Should the legislature conclude that s 21(2) of the MLRA must also be complied with in instances where an interest in a close corporation is transferred, the MLRA will have to be amended.

        26. At present the Department is limited to taking action under s 28 of the MLRA. In instances where the interest in a close corporation is transferred and s 21(2) is not complied with, section 28 authorizes the Department to call for an explanation as to why it should not revoke, suspend, cancel, alter or reduce the the appropriate fishing right.

        28. … As stated above, s 21(2) of the MLRA has no bearing on the sale of the member's interest."

 

1.2 The same reasoning would apply to the sale of shares. The draft transfer policy cannot regulate and interfere with the commercial sale of members’ interests and the sale of shares in terms of the Companies Act. 

1.3 The draft transfer policy is guilty of further overreach as it seeks to regulate “monopolies” and mergers and acquisitions. These regulatory and policy issues are the legal purview of the Department of Trade and Industry and the Competition Commission. The Minister of Fisheries does not have the legal authority under the MLRA to regulate these matters. 

1.4 The draft transfer policy accordingly seeks to bestow on the Minister and officials powers they simply do not possess under the MLRA. 

2. THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE DRAFT POLICY (CLAUSE 4)

2.1 We refer to our comments above regarding policy overreach. 

2.2 While the Minister must have regard to the section 2 principles in the MLRA, which include the issue of transformation, the management of “monopolies” certainly is not a function of the fisheries minister but of the minister of trade and industry. The principle policy objectives and purpose of the draft transfer policy should be to ensure productivity of fisheries, job creation, investments in new fisheries, vessels, processing and marketing infrastructure, innovation and ultimately fisheries and related economic growth. 

2.3 The irrational emphasis on “transformation” as a measure of allowing transfers of fishing rights only harms black right holders who cannot sell to “less transformed” buyers. A fishing right is then a noose around the necks of black right holders and stunts and sterilizes economic activity and growth, which fully explains the current depressed and collapsing state of the commercial fishing sectors. 

3. CLAUSE 7.7 - OVERREACH OVERDRIVE

3.1 The department has no authority to require the Competition Commission to evaluate any transaction that does not trigger the application of the Competition Act.

3.2 This clause should be removed as it is legally invalid. 

4. CLAUSE 7.8 - 1 RIGHT PER FAMILY 

4.1 This draft policy provision is an economically destructive provision that harms fishing communities and should never apply. 

4.2 There are entire households of fishers along our coastline and allocating 1 right to such generational fisher families is archaic and anachronistic and demonstrative of a failure to understand the social and economic structure of fisheries - especially our lobster, abalone and traditional line fisheries.

5. DOCUMENT CERTIFICATION: WHY? 

5.1 Clause 9.3.5 stipulates that documents provided to the department must be certified. It is entirely unclear why this is a requirement given that most supporting documents are electronic and always an “original”. There is accordingly no legal possibility of ever certifying such documents as “copies of the original”. 

5.2 In addition, the requirement is archaic, irrelevant and prejudicial to fishers domiciled in rural, small-scale commercial communities as it unnecessarily adds to the costs of fisheries administration on their part.

6. CONCLUSION 

6.1 Given depressed and rapidly contracting state of the SA commercial fishing sector; and the fact that no new fisheries have been invested in or commercialized since 2004, the transfer policy ought to be a tool to boost economic activity, employment and attract investment into our commercial fishing sectors.

6.2 The draft transfer policy ought to be focussed on incentivizing investments and innovation in our fisheries. This could be accomplished by way of levy rebates and other incentives.

6.3 The current version of the draft transfer policy is nothing but an exemplar of archaic and economically destructive ANC policy, which has been issued under the signature of a DA minister. 

6.4 The present draft transfer policy ought to binned and a fresh, innovative, growth friendly policy adopted instead. 

Climate Change Act and Impacts on & Opportunities for SA Fisheries

 On 23 July 2024, the President of SA assented to the Climate Change Act (22 of 2024). The Act will come into force on a date still to be determined. 

However, the SA fishing industry is listed as a sector that will be subject to the setting of limits on the production of greenhouse gases. 

Section 25(1) of the CCA states that "[t]he Minister must, within one year of the coming into operation of this Act, by notice in the Gazette, list the greenhouse gas emitting sectors and sub-sectors that are subject to sectoral emissions targets."

Section 26(1) states that "[t]he Minister must, by notice in the Gazette, publish a list of greenhouse gases which the Minister reasonably believes cause or are likely to cause or exacerbate climate change." 

Section 26(4) records that: "The thresholds contemplated in subsection (3)(b)—

(a) must be expressed in carbon dioxide equivalents for carbon budgets and

greenhouse gas mitigation plans and shall be applicable at company level

based on operational control;

(b) must be based on the availability of feasible mitigation technology; and 

(c) must take into account any opportunities and constraints to implementation of

policies and measures."

Section 27(1) states that "[t]he Minister must allocate a carbon budget to any person that conducts an activity listed in terms of section 26(2)."

Schedule 1 of the CCA has identified the fisheries sector as being subject to the determination of sectoral emission targets. 

Of course, the "fisheries sector" is far from being an homogenous sector as we well know. The vast differences in the size of individual quota holders across 22 commercial and small scale fishing sectors are profound and provides opportunities for individual companies and fishing sectors to -

• negotiate sustainable emission targets;
• enter into agreements with smaller sectors and companies to sell excess carbon credits to larger companies and sectors. 

A DA-Led Fisheries Administration Looks Certain

For the first time ever, it now seems certain that the South African fisheries and environmental affairs ministry will be led by the Democratic Alliance. 

I have previously written about what should happen IF the DA was to assume leadership of this ministry. Read that here.  It now looks certain that this will happen. 

Sadly, a repeat of the clean-out of the corrupt and incompetent - similar to what happened in 1999/2000 - will be needed. The fisheries branch in particular will need to be re-constituted and re-engineered to ensure that it is able to grow our commercial fisheries sector; serve the fishing industry and fishing communities along our coast and protect our marine ecology from mining and unchecked illegal fishing.  

The next week will be an important one for SA fisheries and environmental affairs. 

Can the Fisheries Ministry Expect a DA Minister?

Will South Africa's Department of Forestry, Fisheries & Environment get a minister from the official opposition, Democratic Alliance, party? 

South African fisheries management is in a depressed state and requires serious and substantial re-invigoration.

What governance aspects and fisheries management areas should a new minister focus on in the first 100 days of office?

These are my suggestions:

1.    New fisheries development and innovation: Lift the ill-advised moratorium on new fisheries development and urgently address the bureaucratic and unnecessarily complicated application to develop and innovate our fisheries. In short, the objective must be to ENCOURAGE expansion of our commercial fisheries and the size of the commercial TAC. And where existing right holders seek to invest in fisheries growth and innovation, make provision for levy rebates. 

2.    FRAP Litigation: There are numerous cases still outstanding from FRAP 2016. These need to be resolved with great urgency. Of particular concern is Minister Creecy's unnecessary "self-review" of her decisions in the hake inshore trawl fishing sector. In addition, there are more than 30 review applications pending in just the hake long and small pelagic fishing sectors. Many of these ought to be settled and rights allocated because of the patently obvious scoring and decision-making errors. 

3.    Re-starting sector-wide consultations and meetings: The new fisheries minister needs to re-commit to consulting with industry on a sector-specific basis as opposed to Creecy's ill-advised "I will only consult with FISH SA". And senior managers need to be talking to industry and fishers more directly and frequently. Fisheries will be better managed when policy-makers spend more time on harbour walls and on the decks of fishing vessels as opposed to on the 7th floor of the Foretrust office building. 

4.    Fisheries crime: Special focus needs to be placed on curtailing lobster and abalone poaching and the massive surge of illegal recreational line fishing in KZN and the sale of recreational caught line fish and tunas. The dedicated anti-poaching green courts with properly trained and staffed personnel need to be re-visited. Abalone fishing rights need to be urgently allocated and a new thinking about the TAC and displacing illegal fishing needs to be adopted. 

5.    Fishing harbours: The management of fisheries harbours such as Hout Bay, which are known conduits of fisheries and other crimes should be devolved to capable local governments and these harbours require rehabilitation and investment by the private sector.

6.    High Seas Treaty: South Africa needs to urgently sign the High Seas Treaty and then to ratify it. 

7.    Review fisheries administration: We need to simplify fisheries administration and management. For one, an urgent review of the multiplicity of permits needed to land and transport fish from one place to another requires re-thinking. Two, the permitting process has to be migrated away from the current ancient hard copy paper process to a simple on-line system capable of being accessed from any computer or smart phone. 

Over the longer term (6 to 18 months) we need to review the MLRA, the 1999 fisheries regulations and current fisheries policy framework, including the embarrassingly cumbersome "transfer of fishing rights" policy.